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Abstract
This paper studies the consequences of peace – or conversely, conflict – on
four outcomes of fundamental economic relevance: Education, health, self-
employment income and household expenditures. While the empirical litera-
ture on the consequences of conflict involving cross-country regression studies
may deliver suggestive big picture evidence on links between conflict and eco-
nomic outcomes, establishing causation remains problematic. By contrast, my
study builds on the rather recent micro-empirical literature and proposes to
use a natural experiment in Nigeria to evaluate the consequences of a reduction
of conflict. The amnesty policy implemented by the Nigerian government in
the Niger Delta Region in 2009 is used as a policy shock to assess the effect of
a conflict reduction on the outcomes of interest. Using a constructed synthetic
control region from the states that are not part of the Niger Delta region and
therefore unaffected by the policy as a within-country counterfactual to the
Niger Delta region, the natural experiment setting enables me to interpret the
results causally and estimate the peace benefits the amnesty policy generated.
I find that peace through the amnesty policy generated an increase in educa-
tion by 0.53 years of schooling, a 67% increase in self-employment income and
a 19% increase in household expenditures four years later.
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1. Introduction
Pax Europaea – the period of relative peace in Europe since World War II – is considered
one of the most fundamental drivers of economic prosperity on the continent for the last
70 years or so. By contrast, many developing countries have experienced periods of war
and civil conflict since the second half of the 20th century began. Although conflict
seems to have such a destructive power for many key economic characteristics of the
people involved and affected, economists have only started to study it towards the very
end of the 20th century. Blattman & Miguel (2010) provide an excellent review of the
literature. Early leading theories on the causes of conflict distinguished between roots
around antagonisms, ethnic divisions and dissatisfaction (“grievances”) and those around
the opportunity for rebellion or insurgency and benefits linked to that (“greed”). More
support is found for the latter in cross-country regression analyses (Collier & Hoeﬄer,
2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). On the consequences of conflict, the early literature has
focused on the links between conflict and economic performance or growth that can be
observed across countries (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Barro, 1991; Collier, 1999). Much more
recently, authors have made use of micro-data that has increasingly become available for
many countries to perform within-country micro-empirical studies of the consequences of
conflict, involving a broader range of outcomes. Such studies are more suitable to find
and disentangle various causal channels. I contribute to this literature with evidence from
Nigeria.
After independence from the British in 1960, a civil war in the late 1960s and almost
thirty years of military rule following the civil war, Nigeria has been under the rule of
democratically elected governments and presidents since 1999. However, different parts
of Nigeria have still experienced various degrees of conflict after the democratisation. In
particular, following tensions that date back a long time, resistance activism turned violent
in the south-eastern Niger Delta region in 2006 and quickly escalated to higher levels of
conflict. As a response, the Nigerian government implemented the so-called ‘Presidential
Amnesty Program’ (PAP) in 2009, in the context of which ex-militants were granted
pardon, received cash and joined a ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’
(DDR) programme in return for surrendering their weapons. The policy was effective in
reducing violence in the region and establishing a period of peace. Along with the fact that
other parts of Nigeria experience conflict between 2009 and 2013, this provides a unique
quasi-experimental setting for estimating the benefits of peace resulting from the amnesty
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policy. For this analysis, I employ the synthetic control method developed by Abadie &
Gardeazabal (2003). In my context, by matching key characteristics of the Niger Delta
region and states outside it for 2009 in an optimisation procedure, this method generates
a synthetic control region made up of a weighted average of four Nigerian states outside
the Niger Delta region that are closely comparable to the Niger Delta region. Serving as a
counterfactual that can successfully reproduce pre-2009 realisations of outcome variables
that I consider, this allows me to estimate the peace dividend1 that the amnesty policy
generated by simply comparing the Niger Delta region and its synthetic control region
four years later.
I consider four outcomes of fundamental economic relevance: Education, health, self-
employment income and household expenditures, where the latter serves as a measure for
overall economic performance. While the micro-empirical literature includes some studies
estimating the consequences of conflict for different measures of education, health and
economic performance, there is – to my knowledge – only one such study (in Mexico) for
self-employment income as an additional measure of economic activity. Considering this
outcome in addition to overall economic performance, however, allows me to observe the
consequences on economic activity in a richer way that will be further elaborated on in this
paper. Therefore, my inclusion of self-employment income as an outcome variable makes
my study a valuable contribution to the existing literature. In addition, on the method-
ological side, I contribute by using the synthetic control method and can specifically test
for some potential pitfalls. One result is that the pre-2009 trend can be matched by the
synthetic control region while it is not parallel for all non-Niger Delta states in general,
a key assumption which the commonly used difference-in-differences (DID) method in
the literature would require. While some studies employing the synthetic control method
have been carried out to evaluate the consequences on economic performance, none have
examined health, education or self-employment income as an outcome variable – again,
to my knowledge. Therefore, in particular for these outcomes, providing an additional
method gives us further confidence that emerging patterns in various studies may have
some degree of general validity.
Broadly in line with the range of results found in the literature, I find that peace gener-
ates 0.53 more years of schooling on average and increases household expenditure at the
1The term ‘peace dividend’ is used in the literature to refer either generally to benefits of newly es-
tablished peace or, in a different and much more specific context, the potential gains generated by
shifting government resources from military expenditure to other uses. Throughout this paper, I refer
to the first notion when using the expression.
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median by 19% four years later. My estimate for an increase in self-employment income at
the median is 67% which is considerably larger than what the only one comparable study
finds in Mexico. In spite of a positive coefficient, my estimate on health is insignificant.
As a general caveat, however, it is worth noting that my standard errors and other mea-
sures imply that there is a substantial degree of uncertainty around my average effects,
so that none of my findings should be taken as very precise point estimates.
Section 2 will provide an overview of the existing literature with regards to the four
outcomes considered in this study, section 3 will give some more contextual background
to the Niger Delta amnesty policy, section 4 informally explores potential theoretical
channels involved in the consequences of conflict for health, education, self-employment
income and household expenditures while section 5 describes the data I use for these
variables. In the main part of this paper, section 6 explains the empirical design of my
study in more detail, section 7 presents the results and section 8 delivers some relevant
robustness checks. Finally, section 9 concludes.
2. Related Literature
The literature on the economic consequences of conflict is quite sizeable.2 Early ap-
proaches, but also some more recent papers, focused on the effects of conflict on overall
economic performance or GDP and employed cross-country regression methods (Alesina
& Perotti, 1996; Barro, 1991; Collier, 1999; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009; Gates et al., 2012;
Murdoch & Sandler, 2002; Stewart et al., 2001). These studies typically show that conflict
and GDP or GDP growth are negatively correlated. The magnitude of the correlation
varies and depends on what the precise link, sample and magnitude is that the authors
consider; for example, both Collier (1999) and Gaibulloev & Sandler (2009) find that GDP
per capita growth is around 2 percentage points lower with conflict3 while Gates et al.
(2012) provide an overall estimate and find that a median-sized conflict is associated with
a reduction of GDP per capita by 15%. Whereas these studies provide some evidence for
the (unsurprisingly) negative association between conflict and may deliver some indica-
tion of how costly conflict can be, they suffer from obvious endogeneity problems which
make it hard to interpret any of the estimates presented as the causal effect running from
2In this review, I will focus on the empirical literature that is related to estimating the consequences of
conflict on the four outcomes that I am estimating in this study: health, education, self-employment
activity and household expenditures. Of course, this is not a comprehensive overview of the vast
theoretical and empirical literature on the consequences of conflict in general.
3Similarly, in a summary paper, Bozzoli et al. (2010) claim that mass violent conflict is associated with
a reduction of GDP growth lying between 1 and 3 percentage points.
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conflict into economic performance. Even when some institutional and socio-economic
control variables or fixed effects in panel regressions are included, it is quite likely that
there are remaining time-varying confounders at the country level and that conflict is
non-randomly placed.
One way to deal with this problem is to estimate the direct and indirect costs of conflict
within a country specifically instead of relying on reduced form cross-country comparisons.
Ali (2013) and Arunatilake et al. (2001) are two studies of this sort that evaluate the costs
of conflict in Sudan and Sri Lanka, respectively. They estimate military expenditures as
direct cost and consider roughly the same channels of indirect cost (lost income from
foregone investment, reduced tourism, reduced labour and human capital, displacement,
destroyed infrastructure, etc.) to come up with a measure of the total annual cost in terms
of GDP. In the case of Sudan, this number amounts to 13% while it is 8-9% in the case of Sri
Lanka according to these estimates. The advantage of this method is indeed to circumvent
endogeneity problems and have a direct estimate of involved channels. However, these
measures are probably quite inaccurate for two reasons. Firstly, in particular the indirect
cost are probably measured with a non-negligible amount of measurement error. Secondly,
it is close to impossible to comprehensively cover all the indirect channels and interactions
between them involved.4
The more prominent approach to address endogeneity concerns has been the use of
within-country variations in recently increasingly available micro-level data. Lopez &
Wodon (2005) use methods of time series analysis to argue that the cost of the Rwandan
genocide range between 25% and 30% of GDP. Other studies use measures of expendi-
tures or income on the household level to capture overall economic performance. Also in
Rwanda, Serneels & Verpoorten (2015) use variation in conflict intensity in an instrumen-
tal variable (IV) approach and also find large impacts on consumption expenditure: A
one standard deviation increase in conflict intensity (measured as war excess mortality)
decreases household consumption by 19% six years later. By contrast, Bellows & Miguel
(2006) do not find a significant relationship between conflict and per capita expenditure
in Sierra Leone a couple of years after the war. In the very long run (around 30 years
later), Saing et al. (2017) (DID approach) and Miguel & Roland (2011) (IV approach)
also fail to find significant effects of US bombing on economic performance measures
in Cambodia and Vietnam, respectively. However, further studies employing the DID
4Such an estimate would require knowledge of fiscal multipliers, production functions, different elastic-
ities, etc.
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(Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Galdo, 2013; Islam et al., 2016) or the synthetic control method
(Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Dorsett, 2013; Gong & Rao, 2016; Matta et al., 2016) find
significant effects of conflict on economic performance.5 The former authors use earnings
as a measure and find effects ranging between -6% and -9% or a marginal reduction by
5% for a one standard deviation increase in conflict between 20 and 40 years later. The
latter authors find substantial effects in the first couple of years following the onset of
conflict ranging between -5% and -20% per year.6
With regards to the effects of conflict on education, on the other hand, a considerable
literature of micro-empirical evidence has emerged recently that seems more conclusive.
The majority of these studies employ essentially a DID approach using variation in conflict
at the school age (or time) and geographic level within a country (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014;
Akresh & De Walque, 2011; Chamarbagwala & Morán, 2011; Islam et al., 2016; Kesternich
et al., 2014; Leon, 2012; Márquez-Padilla et al., 2015; Merrouche, 2011; Pivovarova &
Swee, 2015; Saing et al., 2017; Shemyakina, 2011; Swee, 2015; Valente, 2014). Some of
these studies control for linear time trends or flexible time trends at a more aggregate
geographical level to deal with potential endogeneity arising due to non-parallel trends.
There are some more studies using different methods (Alderman et al., 2006; Blattman
& Annan, 2010; Brown & Velásquez, 2017; Rodriguez & Sanchez, 2012), among which
Blattman & Annan (2010) can make use of a quasi-experimental setting with plausibly
random ‘recruitment’ abductions by rebels in Uganda. Ichino & Winter-Ebmer (2004)
investigate the consequences of World War II for education in Austria and Germany by
comparing the trend over time to Switzerland and Sweden as two unaffected countries. In
spite of the great variety of countries7 and contexts investigated in these studies, the results
are reasonably similar and large. Those authors who estimate life-time accumulation
effects find results ranging between a reducution by 0.2 and 1 year of schooling. To put
this in context, it may be helpful to consider the study Duflo (2001) has carried out in
Indonesia. She finds that each school built per 1000 children in the context of a massive
5I will describe and discuss the synthetic control method in more detail in section 6.1.
6Indeed, the evidence on whether there is convergence in line with the logic of the Solow model or
not in the very long run (at least 20 years after the end of conflict) is not conclusive. While some
estimates suggest there is convergence, other studies find evidence for the opposite. In particular,
some direct evidence on GDP (Chen et al., 2008; Gates et al., 2012; Miguel & Roland, 2011) and
on city size (Brakman et al., 2004; Davis & Weinstein, 2002) suggest convergence. By contrast,
other direct evidence on GDP (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Galdo, 2013; Islam et al., 2016) and a range
of studies on education and health outcomes (Akresh et al., 2012a; Alderman et al., 2006; Ichino &
Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Kesternich et al., 2014; Merrouche, 2011, details see below) that should affect
economic performance according to standard theory suggests that there is no convergence.
7The countries subject to analysis in these papers are Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia,
Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, Mexico, Nepal, Peru, Rwanda, Tajikistan and Uganda.
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school construction programme leads to an increase by 0.12 to 0.19 years of schooling.
Márquez-Padilla et al. (2015) consider enrolment as an outcome variables and are almost
the only ones who do not find an effect in the context of a drug war in Mexico. The only
other study not finding a significant effect is by Pivovarova & Swee (2015) who investigate
the civil war in Nepal. However, Valente (2014) who analyses the same civil war even finds
positive significant effects and gives some historical context explaining why it is not clear
in which direction the effect would go.8 Leon (2012) also estimates short-run effects and
finds a reduction by almost one year of schooling (relative to a long-run effect of 0.31 fewer
years of schooling) suggesting that there is a catch-up effect in the long-run. Shemyakina
(2011) and Swee (2015) do not use years of schooling as an outcome variable, but the
likelihood of finishing mandatory schooling and secondary school enrolment respectively.
In line with the other research, the results are significantly negative.
In terms of the methodology, most studies analysing health effects are equivalent. Based
on the idea that health shocks to children in utero or in early childhood have long-term
consequences,9 they use variation in birth cohorts during conflict and location of conflict
for a DID approach (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Akresh et al., 2012a,b, 2011; Bundervoet et al.,
2009; Galdo, 2013; Islam et al., 2016; Kesternich et al., 2014; Minoiu & Shemyakina, 2014;
Saing et al., 2017). In alternative approaches, Alderman et al. (2006), Camacho (2008)
and Mansour & Rees (2012) manage to isolate plausibly exogenous variation by including
mother fixed effects in their regression approaches, essentially comparing siblings that
were exposed to war to different extents. The studies are not entirely consistent in the
outcome variable chosen which makes them hard to compare. (Birth) weight, height-for-
age scores, height, (infant) mortality and diseases show up as different outcome variables.
However, almost all studies find significantly negative impacts on health.10 The majority
of studies considers the contemporaneous effect on children in utero or early childhood
and all those studies find an effect which, however, is sometimes hard to interpret in
terms of its severity. To this end, Camacho (2008) provides a handy back-of-the-envelope
calculation to make her finding that conflict caused a 8.7 gram reduction in weight (which
may seem a small effect) more meaningful. The effect translates into an expected number
8The argument is basically that the conflict is minor and insurgents actually promoted education, in
particular for girls, by reporting teacher absenteeism and explicitly opposing caste- and ethnicity-
biased traditions as well as gender inequality in the access to it.
9This idea goes back to Barker (1998) who posited the fetal origins hypothesis. More recently, economists
have found evidence for considerable long-run effects of various shocks while in utero or as an infant
(see Almond, 2006; Almond & Currie, 2011a,b; Maccini & Yang, 2009, for some of this evidence and
summaries).
10The authors choosing height-for-age z scores are indeed comparable. The effects found range between
a reduction by 0.42 standard deviations to 1 standard deviation from exposure to conflict.
6
of 360 lives of newborns and infants saved in a non-conflict relative to a conflict area. Only
two studies (Islam et al., 2016; Saing et al., 2017) considering the long-term consequences,
in their context whether exposure to conflict as a child in utero or early childhood affects
height as an adult, do not find a significant effect. Nevertheless, there is a greater number
of studies finding an effect even in adulthood.
Taking all the findings on health and education together, they do seem to paint a fairly
clear picture of the direction and in particular similar magnitude in various contexts.
However, in light of the fact that the DID approach is predominantly used, it is not
clear whether many of these studies suffer from systematic bias arising because of a
potential violation of the parallel trend and Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
(SUTVA). The parallel trend assumption would be violated if control cohorts in conflict
areas (for education, the youngest cohort beyond school age is typically considered; for
health, children above the age of five are considered in most specifications) are affected
by conflict as well, i.e. the time trend between (older) control cohorts and (younger)
treatment cohorts is not the same in conflict and non-conflict areas. In particular for
health, it is not unreasonable to think that war exposure also affects older children.
In fact, Domingues & Barre (2013) provides some evidence that this is the case when
analysing older cohorts of children as well. The SUTVA would be violated if conflict has
spillover effects in non-conflict areas. Again, this is not necessarily unlikely, in particular
when very disaggregate measures of conflict exposure, for example at the district level,
are considered. Migration as a response to conflict would be a typical driver of a SUTVA
violation. Indeed, some studies consider linear trends or perform robustness checks, e.g.
placebo tests and explicit considerations of migration, but this is not generally the case and
few can convincingly alleviate all concerns.11 By contrast, the synthetic control procedure
in this study assesses the overall effect on education and health by using pre- and post-
peace data for matching, not different birth cohorts within the same time period. The fact
that I use the variation in actual time periods covering both conflict and peace enables
me to much more clearly test the pre-trend on years before the peace-generating amnesty
policy whereby the parallel trend cannot mechanically be violated if different cohorts
are affected since I am not using cohort variation. Similarly to the existing literature, I
address a potential SUTVA violation in a robustness check. Therefore, I am the first to
11This is mainly due to the fact that it is very hard to address these concerns in the DID setting using
birth cohort variation. For example, it is not clear whether time developments over different cohorts
are linear, in particular if conflict affects control cohorts. In addition, if conflict affects different control
cohorts in a similar way, placebo tests to this end will fail to show an effect.
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use – to my knowledge – the synthetic control method in the context of the consequences
of conflict for health and education which I consider a valuable and relevant contribution
to the existing literature.
Regarding the effects on employment activity or income, the DID method does not
seem to hold the methodological monopoly. This is not necessarily surprising since health
effects on newborns and infants as well as education effects provide by definition a cohort
variation that can be exploited while any self-employment outcomes affect a broader
range of people. Therefore, there are two ways in which DID approaches could be and
have been applied which both require more comprehensive data. Firstly, the cohort effect
on earnings much later in life can be estimated which naturally requires data during the
time of the conflict and decades later. This type of analysis captures effects via cohort
exposure (e.g. health shocks in utero or early childhood or less education), but no total
conflict effects, and has been carried out by a few authors in different contexts (Akbulut-
Yuksel, 2014; Galdo, 2013; Islam et al., 2016; Nillesen, 2016; Saing et al., 2017). Secondly,
and equivalently to my approach, an overall effect of the war on exposed people can be
estimated, even only a few years later, when pre- and post-conflict data is available.12
This approach has recently been adopted by two researchers in Burundi and the Basque
country (Colino, 2013; Nillesen, 2016, respectively). Other studies exploit panel data
and control for individual heterogeneity (Deininger, 2003; Velásquez, 2015) and/or IV
approaches (Bozzoli et al., 2012; Camacho & Rodriguez, 2013; Collier & Duponchel, 2013;
Kondylis, 2010). Blattman & Annan (2010) make use of a quasi-experimental setting
and Guidolin & La Ferrara (2007) employ the synthetic control method. Apart from
methodological differences, the studies also vary greatly in the outcomes considered. Few
actually consider self-employment activity. Bozzoli et al. (2012) finds that an increase by
4 attacks (the interquartile range) decreased the rate of self-employment by 6.2 percentage
points (on a base of 41%) in Colombia while Deininger (2003) estimates the reduction
in the propensity to start a business through exposure to conflict to be almost 10% in
Uganda. Velásquez (2015) finds a reduction in self-employment earnings for men by 15%
in Mexico. Other outcomes considered include labour supply, coffee farming, firm size
and exit, investment as well as total earnings (discussed above). The effects founds are in
almost all cases significantly negative and substantial. Guidolin & La Ferrara (2007) are
12Note that this may be a non-trivial requirement for longer conflicts. While the cohort variation in the
context of a DID approach only requires data in one post-conflict period – and the massive recent
increase in micro-level data has guaranteed availability for many countries – and data on geographical
conflict intensity, pre-conflict data on outcome variables does not exist in many contexts.
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the only exception who actually find positive effects of conflict on an Angolian portfolio
holding diamond assets.13 This paper shows that for specific industries, conflict may have
positive income effects.
In the context of self-employment, my paper contributes to the literature in two ways.
Firstly, it deploys the synthetic control method that has only been used by Guidolin &
La Ferrara (2007) for specific employment activity outcomes so far.14 Secondly, I use
self-employment income as an outcome variable which sheds light on a slightly different
aspect of employment activity than a measure indicating whether someone is engaged in
a particular business or not. Average self-employment income captures both the extent
to which more business owners induce more competition, crowd out low-productivity
competitors and engender higher average income in more successful businesses and the
extent to which already existing business owners put more time and effort into their
business.
3. Context
The Niger Delta region is an oil rich region in the south eastern part of Nigeria. Since
oil revenues account for a large part of the government’s fiscal budget, it has tradition-
ally been a very important region for policymakers (Abazie-Humphrey, 2014; Obi, 2014).
As Obi (2014) explains, the government has taken over federal control over oil in the
1960s and since then sharply decreased revenue derivation, that is, the share flowing into
regional budgets. This has created tensions in the Niger Delta region and resistance ac-
tivists have become a key actor since the late 1990s. In particular, the ‘Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta’ (MEND) has emerged and became violent from 2006,
marking “an escalation from uncoordinated protests and conflicts into a trans-Delta in-
surgency.” Their violent activities were characterised by oil worker abductions, attacks of
government forces and oil installation sabotages which led to a conflict involving a rapid
decrease in oil production and increase in fatalities.15
By the time Umaru Yar’Adua got elected as president in April 2007, the Niger Delta
conflict has become a pressing issue for the government to solve due to its dependency on
13In fact, they conversely estimate the effect of peace on the portfolio in an event study design and find
that the portfolio value drops as the rebel leader dies suddenly.
14To my knowledge and excluding the few studies on total earnings discussed above and for which my
measure of expenditures is the more appropriate equivalent.
15In fact, as can be seen below, the number of reported fatalities drastically escalates only in 2009.
From 2006 to 2008, therefore, the conflict seems to have manifested itself rather in great uncertainty,
pipeline explosions, and threat of terror.
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oil revenues. He announced an amnesty programme on 25 June 2009 and established the
‘Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee’ (NDPCRC) in July. The amnesty
programme targeted ex-militants and granted “unconditional pardon to all persons who
have directly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activi-
ties in the Niger Delta” in return for surrendering their weapons, renouncing the use of
violence and taking part in a government-sponsored ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration’ (DDR) programme. In fact, the DDR programme was a key and hugely
expensive element of the programme.16 Ex-militants participating in the programme
received a monthly stipend of 65,000 NGN (approx. 440 USD in 2009), support and
vocational training to facilitate their reintegration into society. The amnesty programme
took effect on 6 August 2009 (The Guardian, 2009), from which point militants had a
period of 60 days to sign up. 20,192 rebels signed up during this period; however, further
militants were still approved after the deadline which accumulated the total number of
participants to 30,000 after all (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Premium Times, 2012).
The statistics on post-2009 fatalities show and analysts generally agree that the pro-
gramme was effective in establishing peace in the region, at least for a couple of years
(Abazie-Humphrey, 2014; Obi, 2014; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Oluwaniyi, 2011).17 Abazie-
Humphrey (2014) argues that peace in the region served as a condition for development
and growth through a more stable business environment and the completion of infrastruc-
ture project. In a very simple analysis comparing mean outcomes for the artisan fishing
industry, Achoja et al. (2013) find some suggestive evidence of an improved business sit-
uation. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to exploit the amnesty programme as a policy
shock generating peace to investigate its effect on a range of outcomes.
4. Theoretical Considerations
For each of the outcomes I consider, there are multiple channels how peace may affect
them. Since the direction of the effect is usually clear, I will resort to a brief verbal discus-
sion of the possible mechanisms involved without a formal model. After all, the empirical
16According to Abazie-Humphrey (2014) who refers to a press conference with Kingsley Kuku, the
chairman of the amnesty programme, annual budgets for the programme up until 2014 amounted to
more than 1.8 billion US dollar.
17These authors are, however, sceptical as to whether the policy is able to generate lasting peace. They
generally criticise it for not addressing fundamental causes of the conflict in spite of the government’s
rhetoric viewing the policy as a pathway to sustainable peace. Indeed, some increases in conflict can
be observed in the region from 2015, but in light of the Boko Haram insurgency affecting the whole
country, it is difficult to causally link this back to a failed amnesty policy. In any case, my analysis
focuses on outcomes in 2013 and the data shows a period of peace between 2009 and 2013.
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exercise is mainly about the quantification of these effects. In addition, I will focus on a
discussion of the converse effect, namely the channels how conflict affects my outcomes of
interest, in order to stay in line with the vast majority of the literature regarding and es-
timating the issue from this perspective. The effect of peace then obviously just operates
in the opposite direction.
As for GDP or general economic performance, Collier (1999) provides an overview of
potential channels in his seminal paper. Conflict leads to the destruction of resources,
physical and human capital as well as infrastructure, disruption of order, diversion of
public expenditure from output-enhancing activities, dissaving, increased uncertainty and
decreased foreign investment. From this macro perspective, such effects should all lead
to a reduction in economic performance. Conversely, peace as a reversion of these effects
should lead to increased economic performance, especially in the medium and long run.
However, related to the idea of a rapacity effect as a cause of conflict (Dube & Vargas,
2013), if there is conflict over a valuable resource (which is the case with oil in the Niger
Delta), rebels benefit from resource theft and revenues. Therefore, for those households
involved in conflict, peace may mean a drop in their economic performance, at least in
the short run.18 Naturally, we may expect the reversion of the above effects as peace
unfolds to operate on a larger scale, be relevant for all households and therefore dominate
potential immediate economic losses from resource theft in the medium and long run.
The effect on self-employment activity or income is partly related to general economic
performance effects. The obvious link is that any changes in households’ income trans-
late into demand changes. A demand reduction translates into contraction of businesses
providing the goods demanded. Other than through this link, conflict also directly affects
self-employment. Destruction of infrastructure and increased uncertainty mean higher
cost of production.19 In the specific case of conflict over a natural resource, engaging in
militant activity and resource theft also becomes an alternative supply of labour and some
households may shift some labour into this activity which also reduces labour supplied
to self-employment activity. Taken together, a contraction of self-employment businesses
and higher cost of operation should lead to a reduction in self-employment income. Con-
18This is reflected in the findings by Guidolin & La Ferrara (2007).
19Seiermann (2012) and Ksoll et al. (2016) provide specific examples. The former explores the infrastruc-
ture channel explicitly in Peru. She argues that destroyed infrastructure, in particular roads, leads
to higher cost of market access for self-employed people that need to get to the next market to sell
their products. The latter consider flower exporters in Kenya during times of electoral violence. They
find that firms had to face increased labour absenteeism and pay higher wages as a compensation for
coming to work in times of conflict. Although they consider (larger) firms, the mechanism is clearly
equivalent for self-employed businesses which employ labour.
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versely, peace operates in the opposite direction of these effects and should lead to an
increase in self-employment income.20
With regards to education, three channels are usually discussed in the literature. Firstly,
demand side factors may reduce the amount of schooling obtained during conflict. If con-
flict reduces financial resources,21 an income effect would lead to a reduction in (the
consumption of) education since schooling is costly. Furthermore, especially in the con-
text of developing countries and poor communities, if the reduction in financial resources
pushes households below or close to the subsistence level, a substitution between educa-
tion and income-generating work may kick in. Apart from this chosen education-labour
substitution, involuntary education-labour substitution also occurs in incidences of child
soldiering through forced recruiting or military draft. Secondly, supply side factors may
reduce schooling. This includes the destruction of skills or conflict-related deaths of teach-
ers. Thirdly, a general situation of increased uncertainty and insecurity means that it is
more dangerous to leave the house to attend public institutions.22 When peace starts, the
reversion of all these effects should lead to an increase in education.
Apart from the mechanical effect of conflict-related deaths, there are several ways in
which conflict typically impacts on health. Conflict may have a direct effect on food
security through the destruction of livestock and burning of crops which clearly affects
the health of those suffering from food insecurity. Conflict also leads to displacement
which in particular increases children’s exposure to and risk of water and vector-borne
diseases (Verwimp et al., 2010). In addition, the destruction of health infrastructure
in the course of conflict and lower financial resources reduce access to healthcare and
the demand (ability to pay) for it, respectively. These channels all lead to worse health
conditions during conflict or, conversely, improve health at peace. It is also noteworthy
that a change in health conditions in turn translates into respective changes in work and
education. In particular, better health conditions would lead to increased self-employment
activity and education.23
20Note, in particular, that self-employment activity may increase both on the intensive and extensive
margin as a response to peace which both lead to higher self-employment income. Clearly, business
owners who invest more time and effort into their existing businesses generate more income in so doing.
On the extensive margin, more businesses being set up result in more competition and crowding-out
of the least productive businesses which would also result in higher income on average.
21Although this is potentially not clear in the short run if there is massive involvement of households in
resource theft as discussed above, this should at least be what we observe in the medium and longer
run.
22Strictly speaking, this is a demand side factor as well but the focus here is on the substitution effect
towards other goods arising from an increase in the cost of education. By contrast, the first channel
focuses on the mere income effect from a reduction in financial resources. Therefore, authors like
Shemyakina (2011) and others usually state this channel as a separate point.
23Miguel & Kremer (2004) show how impressive the effect of health on education can be in itself.
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5. Data
5.1. Data Sources
I am using three different sources of data for this study. The first is the Nigerian General
Household Survey (GHS) with socio-economic data on Nigerian households. I am using
survey rounds 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria, 2012).
These surveys provide measures for three of the four outcomes considered: education, self-
employment income and household expenditures. The health measure that I will consider
is indeed recorded in the GHS as well; however, sample sizes for the measure at the state
level are unfortunately very small for most states so that I cannot assume representative
outcomes. The data collection of GHS survey round in year y is actually carried out early
in year y + 1, more precisely, between March and April of the following year. Therefore,
the GHS round 2008 with data on early 2009 is used for the matching procedure to create
the synthetic control region. The GHS rounds 2006 and 2007 serve to verify the validity
of the synthetic control region and assess the common trend assumption in the context of
a DID procedure carried out as a robustness check. Earlier rounds are not available. The
GHS round 2012 provides data on outcome variables.
The second source is the Demographic & Health Survey (DHS) for Nigeria in rounds
five and six covering 2008 and 2013, respectively (DHS Program, 2013). Since the DHS is
only carried out very irregularly in Nigeria, these are the only two rounds of use for me.
The DHS round five (2008) provides the health measure for the matching procedure and
the DHS round six (2013) provides the health measure as outcome variable.
For measures of conflict, I am making use of data provided by the Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, 2015). This is a very rich data source covering
all conflict events with precise location data in many developing states from 1997. In
particular, I am using the data on Nigeria from 2006 to 2009 for the matching procedure
and verification of its validity as well as the common trend assumption for the DID
approach. In addition, I am using data for the years between 2010 and early 2013 to
assess the first stage of my investigation, i.e. whether the matching indeed produces a
synthetic control that displays sustained post-2009 high levels of conflict relative to the
Niger Delta region in which conflict reduces.
There are two main reasons why I consider the 2013 surveys for outcome variables. The
first is practical in nature. DHS round six is the earliest DHS survey provided after the
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policy change in 2009 which is why the earliest post-2009 health measure I consider is only
available then. In order to uphold time consistency with other measures, I also consider
the other outcomes in 2013. Secondly, the amnesty policy established a period of lasting
peace in the Niger Delta region for at least a couple of years24 and peace is likely to have
medium- and long-run consequences. Since these consequences are more interesting to
consider from a welfare perspective than short-term changes and the amnesty programme
took at least a year to show seriously low levels of violent conflict, four years seem to
capture at least medium-run consequences better than earlier outcomes.
5.2. Relevant Measures
As a measure for conflict, I consider fatalities in a conflict event. In particular, for the
matching procedure and as an outcome variable, I use the sum of fatalities in violent
events in a particular state and year as a measure of the degree of conflict. Following
the definition of ACLED regarding political violence, I include the following event types:
Battles (“Battle – No change of territory”, “Battle – Non-state actor overtakes territory”,
“Battle – Government regains territory”), “Remote violence” and “Violence at civilians”.
The predominant reason for the inclusion of these events is that they involve violence and
variation in the number of fatalities. However, even if other event types are included that
are typically associated with no or very few fatalities (e.g. “Strategic development”), the
results do not change dramatically. The main reason for using the sum of fatalities as
opposed to other measures of conflict is that it captures both the extent and intensity
of conflict. As a demonstrating example, consider the following two scenarios of conflict
a state could undergo: Very few events involving enormous amounts of fatalities vs. an
extremely large amount of events with relatively few fatalities each. In my simple cate-
gorisation, the former is rare, but quite intense conflict while the latter means extensive,
but low-intensity conflict. It is unclear whether one scenario represents more conflict than
the other or not. Taking the average number of fatalities in an event would, for example,
capture only the intensity of conflict, but disregard the extent and give the first scenario
a much higher score. Taking the number of incidents as a measure would, on the other
hand, capture the extent, but disregard the intensity and give the second scenario a much
higher conflict rating. Therefore, it seems reasonable to use the sum of fatalities as a
24Conflict increased again to some extent in 2015/16 when the amnesty programme ended and Boko
Haram became violently active. The Niger Delta region has not been as badly affected by Boko
Haram attacks as regions in the North East of Nigeria. However, a few attacks have been carried out
there as well.
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measure in order to capture both elements.
As an education measure, I am employing a standard measure: Years of schooling.
This is observed in great sample size at the state level. For health, I am taking life
expectancy (at birth) as a measure.25 The variable I am using to measure this is mean
death age of household members in the 12 months preceding the survey interview. This
is probably only imperfectly capturing life expectancy in its literal sense (the amount
of years a newborn can expect to live) for two reasons. Firstly, in order to preclude
a mechanical change in life expectancy due to less fatalities from reduced conflict and
capture the route via the impact of conflict on general health conditions in a state, I do
not take sudden deaths into account, such as dying in a conflict incident. I do this by
only allowing for deaths that showed some signs of previous illness. In particular, it must
be indicated that the deceased was sick at least 3 of the 12 months prior to death or had
severe pain or experienced nausea in the preceding month.26 Secondly, since households
were interviewed in the surveys, deaths of long-time ill patients in hospitals or residents
of homes for elderly who do not have an immediate connection to a household cannot
be captured. However, for both sources of inaccuracy, it is reasonable to assume that
they affect both the Niger Delta and non-Niger Delta region in the same way. The first
inaccuracy is precisely designed to prevent a mechanical bias in my results (with the
interpretation of conflict impacting on general health conditions). For the second one to
generate a bias, it would need to evolve systematically differently over time in the two
regions which seems quite implausible.
In order to capture overall economic capacity or welfare, I use a measure of household
expenditures. Although this does not capture savings, I prefer this measure over household
income for several reasons. Firstly, household income is imprecisely measured. For the
GHS 2008 survey, the monthly income is only measured in 1000s of NGN (1000 NGN
were approximately 6.80 USD in 2009) which – although this seems to be a fairly small
inaccuracy in absolute terms – may have non-negligible implications given the fact that
25% of the population report to have an income below 6000 NGN. For the 2012 survey,
the income question is on the last payment and not for a specific time period. In light
25I am deviating from the most commonly used measures in the literature evaluating the impact of
conflict on health, namely height or height-for-age z scores of children. The predominant reason for
using my measure is that it is quite unclear how to assess the meaningfulness of effects on the height
measures while it is straightforward to interpret changes in life expectancy. However, as a robustness
check, I have also checked whether my results hold up when using height or height-for-age z scores
from the DHS 2009 and 2013 survey as a measure for health. Indeed, for both measures, I do not find
a significant effect either.
26These three indicator variables are available in the DHS rounds to capture the notion of a preceding
process of illness.
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of the high irregularity of income flows that is common for many people in developing
countries, it is unclear how informative and accurate such a measure is. Secondly, key
quantiles in the distribution of monthly income and expenditures in the GHS 2008 survey
used for the matching procedure are very close. It doesn’t seem to be the case that
large amounts of constant saving disguise the true welfare of household. Thirdly, and
relatedly, household expenditures also capture the ability of households to smooth out
consumption. While income measures for the last month may be due to high degrees
of fluctuation, expenditures are much more smooth and provide a clearer picture of the
household’s economic welfare situation. Indeed, the distribution of expenditures for the
GHS 2008 survey looks considerably more smooth than the one for income.
As another measure of economic activity that may differently be affected by conflict than
overall economic capacity or welfare, I consider self-employment income.27 In particular
in the developing country context, it seems reasonable to consider self-employment as an
economic activity which includes many small and micro-businesses that a substantial share
of households run relative to formal waged employment. Regarding income as a measure
as opposed to a mere measure of whether household members own a business or not, this
captures the extent of self-employment activity arguably better. It obviously captures
any additional time and effort going into one’s business as well as success through a more
conducive environment. In addition, however, it also captures an increase in the number
of businesses indirectly since this would translate into more competition, crowding-out of
low-productivity businesses, and therefore higher income on average.
In order to capture the average in a meaningful way for both household expenditures
and self-employment income, I am using the median as opposed to the mean for standard
reasons. The mean is subject to high volatility for such measures coming from changes in
the extreme top part of the distribution. This is a potentially particularly severe issue in
my context where I only have data on monthly expenditures and self-employment income
in the month preceding the survey interview.28
27See section 4 for a small exploration of the different mechanisms at play.
28In fact, I verified that – if cutting the extreme 1% of the data to eliminate some degree of volatility –
using the mean measure does not change the results dramatically.
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6. Empirical Design
6.1. The Synthetic Control Method
In order to get a valid counterfactual region that the Niger Delta region can be compared
to after the policy implementation, I employ the same method as Abadie & Gardeazabal
(2003) for their investigation of the economic cost of conflict in the Basque region in Spain
in the late 1960s. I am constructing a synthetic control region from the states that are
outside the Niger Delta region and thus not affected. 28 states are outside the Niger Delta
region (denote this number NNND = 28) and remained unaffected by the policy. The idea
is to use a weighted average of these 28 states that is comparable to the population
weighted average of the nine Niger Delta states prior to the policy implementation. Since
I am investigating the impact of the policy on education, health, household expenditures
and self-employment activity, it seems appropriate to make the synthetic control region
comparable to the Niger Delta region in these characteristics before the policy change.
In addition, I am taking a measure of conflict before 2009 into account which is what
the policy addresses. Therefore, the appropriate weights for the 28 states outside the
Niger Delta region that construct the synthetic control regions arise as the solution to the
following optimisation problem:
min
w
(Xv − Y w)′(Xv − Y w)
s. t. wj ≥ 0 ∀j,
28∑
j=1
wj = 1
where X is a (5 × 9) matrix of the early 2009 measures29 of conflict, education, health,
self-employment income and household expenditures in the nine Niger Delta states (denote
this number NND = 9), Y is a (5 × 28) matrix of the same measures in the 28 non-Niger
Delta states, v is a (9 × 1) vector of the population weights for the Niger Delta states
and the minimand (28 × 1) vector w captures the weights on the non-Niger Delta states
that are to be optimised.
The resulting optimal vector w∗ has non-zero weights for only four of the 28 non-
Niger Delta states (denote the number of states included in the synthetic control region
29In order to guarantee comparability in the scale of the different measures, I am using constructed z
scores of each measure by standardising on the 28 non-Niger Delta control states. However, I am
reporting the non-standardised values for ease of interpretation in the following.
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NSC = 4): Anambra (24%), Borno (21%), Lagos (23%) and Ogun (32%). The Niger
Delta and synthetic control states are displayed in Figure 1.30
Figure 1: Niger Delta and Synthetic Control Region
Note: The Niger Delta states are displayed in blue while the syn-
thetic control states are displayed in black.
The synthetic control region overcomes the substantial gap between the population
weighted average of Niger Delta states and a mere population weighted average of states
outside the Niger Delta region before the policy change. A simple comparison between
these two regions would be subject to selection bias and lead to massive overestimation of
the effects since the non-Niger Delta states perform systematically worse than the Niger
Delta states in all relevant characteristics. However, the synthetic control constructed
using the weights w∗ is comparable to the population weighted average of Niger Delta
states. In addition, providing some confidence that w∗ actually provides a valid counter-
factual region, it can map the outcome variables in the Niger Delta region in years prior
to 2009, for which data is available and that are not included in the matching procedure,
reasonably well. Although data on conflict is available going back until 1997, violent
activities in the Niger Delta region have only started in 2006 which is why the trend from
2006 is considered. For the education, expenditures and self-employment income previous
GHS survey rounds with data on 2007 and 2008 can be used. Unfortunately, these rounds
have too few observations on deaths in 2007 and 2008 to have meaningful representative
statistics. Table 1 and Figures 2 to 5 display the available results.
What is particularly striking about the synthetic control region is that it does not fail
to match the sharp upward conflict trend from 2006 culminating in high conflict levels in
30The shares are rounded to the nearest integer. All other states have a weight of zero rounded to the
nearest integer. It is not unusual that only a minority of potential control states has a non-zero
weight. Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), Gong & Rao (2016) and Matta et al. (2016) similarly get that
only fewer than five control states or countries out of a considerably larger set have non-zero weights.
Three out of four states making up the synthetic control region are indeed spatially close to the Niger
Delta region. Section 8.2 deals with potential spillover concerns.
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Table 1: Matching Results
Variable Niger Delta (ND) non-ND (NND) Synth. Control (SC)
(p-value ND-NND) (p-value ND-SC)
Matched Variables
Fatalities 2009 163.7 28.7 (n/a) 151.2 (n/a)
Yrs. of Schl. 2009 7.60 6.85 (0.00) 7.62 (0.76)
Death Age 2009 42.92 29.34 (0.00) 40.24 (0.54)
Emp. Income 2009 94.81 62.98 (0.00) 91.47 (0.44)
Expenditures 2009 100.30 89.00 (0.00) 101.95 (0.56)
Non-matched Trend
Fatalities 2006 2.9 3.2 (n/a) 13.4 (n/a)
Fatalities 2007 16.9 11.7 (n/a) 16.8 (n/a)
Fatalities 2008 16.2 4.4 (n/a) 11.2 (n/a)
Yrs. of Schl. 2007 7.58 6.86 (0.00) 7.57 (0.92)
Yrs. of Schl. 2008 7.28 6.58 (0.00) 7.37 (0.36)
Emp. Income 2007 72.22 66.68 (0.21) 61.29 (0.08)
Emp. Income 2008 107.98 90.02 (0.04) 102.98 (0.67)
Expenditures 2007 94.96 69.22 (0.00) 73.05 (0.01)
Expenditures 2008 155.26 126.76 (0.00) 187.20 (0.03)
Note: The outcome variables considered are explained in section 5.2. Both self-employment income
and expenditures are reported in USD. Standard errors for mean years of schooling and mean death
age are based on standard deviations at the state level and computed according to the weighting.
Standard errors for median self-employment income and median expenditures are based on boot-
strapped standard deviations with 500 replications at the state level and computed according to
the weighting. P-values are based on t statistics with min{NND, NNND} − 1 = 8 d.o.f. for the
difference between ND and NND and min{NND, NSC} − 1 = 3 d.o.f. for the difference between
ND and SC. Both are computed for two-sided tests. Since the measure for conflict is aggregate
data on the universe of conflict, typical standard errors are not available. For more discussion of
uncertainty with aggregate data when using the synthetic control method, see section 8.3.
Figure 2: Conflict Matching
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Note: In these and all following figures, the blue thick
line displays the Niger Delta values, the black thick and
dashed line displays the synthetic control values and the
red thin line displays the non-Niger Delta values.
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Figure 3: Education Matching
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Figure 4: Employment Income Matching
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Figure 5: Expenditures Matching
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2009 in the Niger Delta region very well. The match for median household expenditures
is not as close as for the conflict and education measure prior to 2009, but arguably still
matches the Niger Delta region better than the population weighted average of non-Niger
Delta states. In particular, the synthetic control underestimates in 2007 and overestimates
in 2008; however, the average over the two years is very close to the Niger Delta region
(130.13 USD in the synthetic control region and 125.11 USD in the Niger Delta region)
while it is substantially lower in the 28 states outside the Niger Delta region (97.99 USD).31
Comparing the synthetic control method to standard regression techniques (involving
in particular DID regression methods that are commonly used in the micro-empirical
literature on the effects of conflict), three distinct advantages of the former method emerge.
Firstly, while it can be shown that a regression-based estimator would essentially also
produce a weighted average of potential control states with the weights summing up
to one, the weights may lie outside the unit interval (Abadie et al., 2015). Therefore,
regression techniques allow for extrapolation and hence potential extrapolation problems
whereby the extent of extrapolation is typically unknown to the empirical analyst since
the weights are usually not computed in practice. Secondly, and especially relevant to
this multi-outcome analysis, a regression-based analysis would not produce the same
counterfactual for all the outcomes while the synthetic control method – given its success
in reproducing the pre-2009 trend in this case – may more convincingly deliver estimates
of the causal effects of peace. Thirdly, the commonly used DID techniques do not allow
to control for time-varying fixed effects in different regions while the synthetic control
method does.32 Abadie et al. (2010) prove that the synthetic control method is essentially
a generalisation of the usual DID model in precisely the way that it allows unobserved
31It also becomes very clear that there is no linear or uni-directional trend for education, employment
income and expenditures. There are several important developments that may be reasons for the
patterns observed: General elections in 2007, a sharp food price hike in 2008 and the financial crisis in
2008. Multiple channels are conceivable. Sharply increasing food prices from 2007 to 2008 (UNFAO,
2009) may have increased expenditure mechanically, but may also have resulted in substitution away
from children’s education towards income-generating activity through lower income. The crisis may
have hit Nigeria throughout 2008 and resulted in worse economic performance in 2009, in particular in
the Niger Delta region suffering from oil price drops as the Central Bank’s governor suggested (CBN,
2009). The new president’s policy may have had its own effect on education and economic performance.
Irrespective of what combination of key events or developments may explain these patterns, however,
it is more important for my identification that the synthetic control region matches the Niger Delta
region in this trend.
32While it is possible to control specifically for potentially confounding observable variables – here, past
realisations of outcome variables could for example be controlled for – and hence capture their time-
varying effects within regions, this does not solve the problem entirely. First of all, there may still
be unobserved characteristics that vary in time. In fact, including past outcome variables in the
DID regressions that I carried out as robustness checks does not change the results substantially.
In addition, this still imposes a linear relationship between the observed control variables that are
included while the synthetic control method does not make such a parametric assumption. Finally,
including past outcome variables as control variables engenders the standard problem of putting the
assumption of no correlation between the error term and regressors at risk since any degree of auto-
correlation in the error would result in a violation of the assumption.
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characteristics to vary with time. The key common trend assumption in DID analyses
which basically assumes away that unobserved characteristics in treatment and control
units are time-varying can actually be verified in my data. Since my data allows me to
observe how the treatment and control states evolve with regards to three of the outcomes
of interest in the two years preceding the policy implementation in 2009, it can actually be
observed how the common trend fails between 2008 and 2009 for self-employment income
and household expenditures (see Figures 4 and 5). In fact, implementing a simple DID
procedure as a robustness check, I show that the DID results deviate from the results
coming out of the synthetic control method in exactly the direction of the violations of
the common trend assumption (see section 8.1 for details).
6.2. Interpretation and Potential Concerns
It is instructive at this point to think about the interpretation of results coming out of the
synthetic control method in the study context given that I take the unusual approach of
evaluating peace in the Niger Delta region relative to continued conflict in other Nigerian
states serving as counterfactual. Most studies conversely evaluate either ongoing conflict
relative to peace or the consequences of a period of conflict some time after the conflict
has ended (with greatly varying time horizons) by comparing areas that were affected
by conflict to counterfactual areas that did not experience conflict in the past. I choose
to evaluate peace relative to continued conflict because the amnesty policy in the Niger
Delta region and conflict in other Nigerian states after 2009 provide a unique (quasi-
experimental) setting for this estimation. Conflict in the period between 2009 and early
2013, especially the later part of this period, happens in a number of Nigerian states
mainly – but not exclusively – in the North Eastern part of the country where Borno
lies, one of the states making up the synthetic control region. This is partly driven by
Boko Haram’s activities in that region. In this sense, the results I am finding can also
be interpreted as the contemporaneous impact of continued conflict in some parts of the
Nigeria (represented by the synthetic control region) relative to peace in a comparable
Niger Delta region. However, I prefer to interpret them conversely as the benefits of
peace in the Niger Delta region relative to what would have happened counterfactually
in the same region had the policy not been implemented. This is essentially an estimate
of a peace dividend, an evaluation of the potential damage the amnesty policy prevented.
To some degree, since the counterfactual displays (only) sustained levels of conflict very
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comparable to the ones in 2009, this may even be a lower bound of the true peace dividend.
The reason is that it is not clear whether conflict levels would have been sustained or
further escalated in the absence of the amnesty policy. Given long underlying tensions
and violent conflict that sparked shortly before 2009, it may not be unreasonable to
assume that an escalation of conflict would provide a more realistic counterfactual.
Related to the interpretation and context, one may wonder why an amnesty policy was
carried out as a response to conflict in the Niger Delta region and not in other states of
Nigeria that experienced ongoing conflict and – more importantly – whether the under-
lying reasons pose a threat to identification. Clearly, the fact that the Niger Delta region
is an oil rich region and that the oil production is a main determinant of the govern-
ment’s fiscal resources plays a role. However, I argue that this is not a concern for bias
and internal validity and, if anything, affects external validity. First of all, any relevant
influence of systematic differences in oil production between the Niger Delta region and
the synthetic control region should show up in the pre-2009 trend which is actually well
matched. Furthermore, oil production was decreasing in the Niger Delta region before
2009 (Abazie-Humphrey, 2014; OPEC, 2010). Any concern (in the sense of an omitted
variable) postulating that oil production may have picked up before 2009 when the pol-
icy happened to be put in place and therefore observed effects are actually confounded
with positive effects of already increasing oil production before 2009 is inconsistent with
such a decrease. Much to the contrary, in fact, it seems likely that the policy was put
in place precisely because of massive losses from decreased oil production due to conflict.
However, this means that the effects of peace (partly) operate through increased oil pro-
duction after 2009 which is not a source of endogeneity, but just a channel through which
peace operates.33 Therefore, my results just provide a reduced form effect of peace from
all possible channels. Of course, because of the Niger Delta’s oil richness, the region is
particularly suitable and may be expected to generate large benefits from peace. This is
an issue of external validity, related to the idea of “site selection” in randomised controlled
trials (Allcott, 2015). As a consequence, and as usual, my results should first and fore-
most be interpreted as the effect generated in the specific context of conflict in the Niger
Delta region. To assess to what extent external validity may be compromised, it is then
instructive to regard them in light of findings from different settings.
33Note that the synthetic counterfactual displays sustained levels of conflict reflecting a counterfactually
sustained low oil production. Again, if anything, it seems reasonable to assume that conflict may
actually have escalated further and induced further drops in fiscal revenues from oil production, in
which case the results are lower bounds.
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7. Results
7.1. The First Stage
While the sharp conflict trend was stopped and reversed in the Niger Delta region as a
consequence of the policy from 2010, the synthetic control region continues to show high
conflict levels after the policy implementation. Figure 6 depicts this first stage relationship
very clearly. The synthetic control region maintains high conflict levels relative to both the
Niger Delta region and the non-Niger Delta states after the amnesty policy implementation
in 2009. Although there is a sharp drop in the synthetic control region in 2010, conflict
levels are high again and comparable to the 2009 Niger Delta levels from 2011 to 2013. It
is particularly convenient that conflict levels are very similar in the synthetic control in
early 2013 and in the Niger Delta region in 2009 since the peace dividend estimation is
based on outcomes in early 2013. By contrast, a population weighted average of all states
outside the Niger Delta region does not match these conflict levels.34
7.2. Main Results
Comparing the Niger Delta region to its synthetic control region in early 2013, the effect
of peace in the Niger Delta region on education, health, self-employment income and
expenditures is considered in this section. Table 2 and Figures 7 to 10 summarise the
main findings.
Table 2: Main Results
Variable Niger Delta non-ND Synth. Control ND - SC
(ND) (NND) (SC) (Std. Err.)
Yrs. of Schl. 2013 8.56 7.21 8.03 0.53∗∗∗ (0.11)
Death Age 2013 44.65 30.72 39.13 5.52 (3.85)
Emp. Income 2013 118.25 50.17 70.85 47.39∗∗ (12.87)
Expenditures 2013 193.47 140.00 163.11 30.35∗∗ (7.67)
Note: The outcome variables considered are explained in section 5.2. Both self-employment income
and expenditures are reported in USD. Standard errors for mean years of schooling and mean death
age are based on standard deviations at the state level and computed according to the weighting.
Standard errors for median self-employment income and median expenditures are based on boot-
strapped standard deviations with 500 replications at the state level and computed according to
the weighting. Tests are computed based on t statistics with min{NND, NSC} − 1 = 3 d.o.f. and
for one-sided tests (in line with the theoretical predictions). ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significane at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The results represent a peace dividend over a period of four years. Except for the
health effect, all results are significant at the 5% level. The substantial magnitude of
34As a second piece of evidence for the first stage using simple regression analyses within the Niger Delta
region only, see appendix A.
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Figure 6: Conflict Levels Before and After 2009
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Note: In these and all following figures, the blue thick line displays the Niger Delta
values, the black thick and dashed line displays the synthetic control values and the
red thin line displays the non-Niger Delta values. By 2013, the first six months of 2013
are meant since outcome variables in 2013 were collected between April and June.
Figure 7: Education Results
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Figure 8: Health Results
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Figure 10: Expenditures Results
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the results suggests that there are considerable benefits from peace or, conversely, severe
consequences of conflict. Average education increases by 0.53 years of schooling. To
put this in relation to the estimates from the existing literature, consider only children
under the age of 18 which corresponds to the school age cohort that most authors have
focused on. For this age group, the effect is even larger, namely an increase by 0.81
years of schooling which is in the range of what the literature finds in different contexts.
According to estimates by Aromolaran (2006) and Schultz (2004), returns to primary and
secondary schooling in Nigeria range between 2% and 7% and are even higher for post-
secondary education (10%-15.5%).35 Given these estimates, even if we were to ignore the
potentially overestimated returns for post-secondary education which only about 10% of
the Nigerian population enjoyed in 2013, an average increase by half a year of schooling
has a meaningful long-term economic effect.
The effect on health is indeed positive, but not significantly different from zero. How-
ever, since this is not a precise zero estimate either, it is hard to conclude anything from
the result. Given rather small sample sizes of deaths in many states, large standard errors
were to be expected and I do not have enough statistical power to detect changes that
are not extremely large.
35Even though these authors merely run OLS regressions on household survey data, they argue that the
potential upward bias from omitted socio-economic factors may very well be offset by downward bias
from measurement error, referring to Card (1999) and Ashenfelter & Krueger (1994). In particular
for primary and secondary education, the quality of education measurements in the household surveys
would suggest that this is quite likely to be the case or that the bias from measurement error may
even be larger in which case, if anything, their return estimates provide lower bounds.
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With regards to both measures for economic activity, I find substantial effects. In the
Niger Delta region, self-employment income is 47.39 USD higher than in the synthetic
control region at the median and household expenditures exceed its counterfactual by
30.35 USD at the median. The relative effects are enormous. Given the counterfactual
median values, these differences represent 67% and 19% increases, respectively. Since
the match for household expenditures for years before 2009 is not perfect and there are
significant differences between the Niger Delta and synthetic control region, one might be
concerned about bias of the estimator. However, as discussed before, the averages over
2007 and 2008 in the Niger Delta and the synthetic control regions are extremely close
since the match is just producing more extreme value in 2007 and 2008 (in 2007, the
synthetic control is a bit too low and it is somewhat too high in 2008). In addition, given
the fact that the fall between 2008 and 2009 is sharper in the synthetic control region, any
DIDID procedure that would take this differential pre-trend into account would produce
an even larger estimate of the effect of peace in 2013. In this sense, the estimate I am
reporting may even be a lower bound.
In relation to the existing literature, the effect on self-employment is considerably larger
than what the only comparable study in Mexico finds (Velásquez, 2015). This may hint at
the external validity issue discussed above;36 however, since there is only one comparison
study, it is generally hard to draw any conclusions. In addition, my results on overall
economic performance, here captured by household expenditure, are in line with what
the most closely comparable literature finds. In any case, the large findings on self-
employment income suggest that this may be an exciting channel to explore further in
future research.
With regards to the theoretical considerations, the results are in line with what peace
is expected to generate. In particular, the effect on household expenditure, taken as a
measure of overall economic performance, is strongly positive. Clearly, the medium-run
benefits of peace significantly dominate any potential immediate economic losses from
diminished militant activity and oil theft. We can also observe that the increases in self-
employment income are relatively larger than the increase in overall economic performance
which may reflect that some labour supply shift from military activity and oil theft into
self-employment activity has indeed taken place. Of course, alternative explanations may
be that not all additional income is spent, but part of it is saved, or that self-employment
36The fact that we may expect large economic benefits of peace in the oil-rich Niger Delta region may be
due to both any spin-off businesses of the oil industry and the fact that oil or any derivative materials
are key inputs in many businesses, e.g. for using generators or cars.
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activity has increased relatively more strongly than waged labour supply as a response to
peace.
8. Robustness
The fact that the synthetic control region can map the pre-2009 trend on the outcome
variables on which it was not matched (i.e., this is not a mechanical result) reasonably well
provides some confidence that the matching procedure generated an appropriate counter-
factual. Building on that, I will present DID estimates and checks for spillovers as further
robustness checks in this section. In addition, addressing both the issue of matching
uncertainty and robustness against confounding forces, a placebo study is presented here.
8.1. DID Results
As a first robustness check, I will use a simple DID approach as an alternative method
and present the results.37 In particular, I can demonstrate that the DID results are in line
with my previous results for outcomes for which the parallel trend assumption holds and
deviate from the results in the expected direction for outcomes for which the pre-2009
trend for the non-Niger Delta states deviates from the Niger Delta and synthetic control
region. Table 3 presents the results.
Comparing the results from the DID and synhetic counterfactual procedure, it must
first of all be noted that the two estimators are not significantly different for any of the
four outcome variables (the lowest p-value on the four difference tests is 0.32 – for me-
dian household expenditures). As for education and health, the difference between the
two estimators is very small. In the case of the former outcome, we can observe the
pre-trend and note that the parallel trend assumption strongly appears to be satisfied
which is consistent with finding coinciding DID and synthetic counterfactual estimates.
Graphically, Figure 7 demonstrates this clearly. Especially for the employment income
37The simple comparison is essentially just a comparison of two differences in means. In regression
format, the DID estimator would be the coefficient δ in:
yit = α+ βNDi + γT2013t + δ(NDi × T2013t) + uit
where yit and uit are the outcome and error term in state i and year t respectively, ND is a dummy
variable indicating whether state i is in the Niger Delta region or not and T2013 is a dummy taking the
value 1 if the year is 2013. Most DID approaches are finer in the sense that they control for regional
fixed effects by taking a dummy variable for each region instead of a coarser distinction between Niger
Delta states and non-Niger Delta states only. However, which set of dummies is used does not make a
difference for the magnitude of the DID estimator δ. The finer approach can only increase precision.
For health, the only insignificant result that emerges with the simple DID means comparison, taking
a set of state dummies still gives a large standard error and no significance.
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Table 3: DID Results
Variable ND NND DID ND - SC Trend Deviation
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (2009-2008)
Yrs. of Schl. 2013 8.56 7.21 0.59∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0
Yrs. of Schl. 2009 7.60 6.85 (0.09) (0.10)
Death Age 2013 44.65 30.72 0.35 5.52 n/a
Death Age 2009 42.92 29.34 (3.70) (3.85)
Emp. Income 2013 118.25 50.17 36.24∗∗ 47.39∗∗ +
Emp. Income 2009 94.81 62.98 (13.04) (12.87)
Expenditures 2013 193.47 140.00 42.17∗∗∗ 30.35∗∗ -
Expenditures 2009 100.30 89.00 (6.36) (7.67)
Note: ND: Niger Delta region; NND: non-Niger Delta states; SC: Synthetic Control region. The
outcome variables considered are explained in section 5.2. Both self-employment income and
expenditures are reported in USD. The trend deviation (DID 2009-2008) for years of schooling is
a quite precisely estimated zero (-0.07, p-value: 0.63). Standard errors for mean years of schooling
and mean death age are based on standard deviations at the state level and computed according to
the weighting. Standard errors for median self-employment income and median expenditures are
based on bootstrapped standard deviations with 500 replications at the state level and computed
according to the weighting. Tests are based on t statistics with min{NND, NNND}−1 = 8 d.o.f. for
the DID estimator and min{NND, NSC} − 1 = 3 d.o.f. for the synthetic counterfactual estimator.
Both are computed for one-sided tests (in line with the theoretical predictions). ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote significane at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
and expenditure measure, however, the fact that the two estimates are statistically indis-
tinguishable may not necessarily be a result of the two estimators in fact coinciding, but
of large standard errors. Nevertheless, considering the point estimates, the direction of
the DID estimator’s deviation is perfectly in line with pre-trend differences between the
Niger Delta states and those outside the Niger Delta region. Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate
this point graphically. It seems that the two regions follow a similar trend between 2007
and 2008 and have different trends between 2008 and 2009. Therefore, the direction of
the common trend assumption’s violation can be well captured by a simple DID between
2009 and 2008. As for median self-employment income, this trend deviation is positive.
Therefore, we would expect the DID estimator to underestimate. In the case of median
household expenditures, the trend deviation is negative and we would expect the DID
estimator to overestimate. Relative to the estimator using the synthetic counterfactual,
these are exactly the bias directions that we observe.38 The fact that in precisely these
two cases in which we observe non-negligible differences between the two estimators, they
are in line with the direction of the common trend violation and that we do not observe
differences when there are no or no observable such violations, should place some further
38With regards to the magnitude of bias, the standard errors are extremely large which makes it impos-
sible to make precise statements on whether the magnitude of the bias reflects the actual difference
observed between the two different estimators. Indeed, the point estimates are close and statistically
indistinguishable in both cases. For median self-employment profits, the estimator difference is 11.15
and the trend deviation is 13.87; for median household expenditures, the estimator difference is -11.82
and the trend deviation is -17.21.
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confidence in the main results found using the synthetic counterfactual.
8.2. Spillover Effects
Since three of the four states that are part of the synthetic control region are quite close to
the Niger Delta region, one might be concerned about spillover effects. Any effect of peace
in the Niger Delta region on states outside it would form a violation of the Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) and bias the results. There are potential spillover
effects in two directions that would bias the results in opposite ways. Firstly, there may be
spillover effects from peace on other states that would form a positive impact on them, for
example through increased trade with neighbouring states if economic activity improves in
the Niger Delta region or through infrastructure extending into neighbouring states. Such
effects would mean that states outside the Niger Delta region are also “treated” and their
outcomes would show up more positively than the true counterfactual should. Therefore,
these effects go against my results and would mean that I am underestimating and the
true effect is even larger than what I find. Secondly, posing more reason for concern, peace
in the region may attract people from other states into the Niger Delta region. In this
case, outcomes of states outside the Niger Delta region would show up more negatively
than the true counterfactual should and I would overestimate the true effect. Typically –
and plausibly – these effects would be stronger for states that are closer to the treatment
region which is what I am exploiting to test for spillover effects.
As a first piece of evidence against the presence (or dominance of) one type of spillovers,
consider the above DID results again. The particular spillover concern with the synthetic
control region is that three out of the four states making it up are very close to the Niger
Delta region. The DID approach, however, takes all 28 non-Niger Delta states as part
of the counterfactual. Since spillovers are expected to be stronger in states closer to the
treatment region, the DID results should be systematically different from the main results
using the synthetic control region in their presence. This is not the case. Not only are the
DID results not significantly different, but also do different point estimates for median
self-employment income and median expenditures go in different directions. They do not
jointly indicate the prsesence or domanince of one type of spillover. Much rather, as
discussed above, these differences can be explained by pre-trend deviations.
Migration flows, taken from the GHS 2012 survey, shall serve as a second piece of
evidence against the presence (or dominance of) one type of spillovers. The particular
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spillover concern in terms of migration flows is that there may be a massive inflow of (in
particular highly economically contributing) people into the Niger Delta region from the
synthetic control region relative to the opposite flow in times of peace or that peace gener-
ally attracts in-migration in which case states closer to the Niger Delta region should show
more migration into that region than states further away. Table 4 demonstrates that both
these concerns do not seem to apply. In fact, the migration flow of people from synthetic
control states into the Niger Delta region is very small in absolute terms and considerably
(as well as statistically significantly) lower than the opposite migration flow (the same
result holds when comparing the share of migration from the synthetic control region into
the Niger Delta region and vice versa). In addition, both the migration flow from states
directly neighbouring the Niger Delta region (NS)39 and from the synthetic control region
into the Niger Delta region are very close (and indeed statistically indistinguishable) to
the general migration flow from non-Niger Delta states into the Niger Delta region (again,
the same result holds true when comparing migration shares). Therefore, the data does
not suggest that the migration flow from states that are closer to the Niger Delta region
is over-representative of the general migration flow into the Niger Delta region which is
what we would expect to see if the second type of spillover effects was at play.
Table 4: Migration Flows
Move from SC Move from NS Move from NND Move from ND
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Move to SC 1.95%
(0.0024)
Move to NS 0%
(0)
Move to ND 0.47% 0.40% 0.45% 13.02%
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0027)
Move to NND 10.59% 12.45% 7.75% 3.05%
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0027)
Total Migration 11.05% 12.84% 8.20% 16.06%
(0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0018) (0.0045)
Note: SC: Synthetic Control region; NS: States directly neighbouring the Niger Delta region; NND:
non-Niger Delta states; ND: Niger Delta region.
8.3. Placebo Study
A typical disadvantage of synthetic control methods that work with aggregate data is that
aggregate data does not provide standard errors indicating any uncertainty as to whether
39These eight states have a common border with at least one of the Niger Delta states and are thus
defined to be the neighbouring states: Anambra, Benue, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Enugu, Kogi, Ogun, Osun.
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a sample is reflective of a population (Abadie et al., 2010). For example, studies that em-
ploy GDP data to produce a synthetic control for some treatment region (or country) from
a set of potential control regions (or countries) essentially use the universe of available
GDP observations in their context.40 Standard inference uses standard errors reflecting
the unavailability of aggregate data. However, not all uncertainty is due to lacking aggre-
gate data. In studies employing the synthetic control methods, “an additional source of
uncertainty derives from ignorance about the ability of the control group to reproduce the
counterfactual of how the treated unit would have evolved in the absence of treatment”
(Abadie et al., 2010). In this study, I actually use sample averages from household surveys
for my outcome variables which is why I can produce classic standard errors reflecting the
uncertainty around whether the sample is representative of the universe of households. In
a way, this uncertainty also captures the extent to which the Niger Delta region and its
synthetic counterfactual are comparable before the policy intervention and differ after it.
The underlying assumption is essentially that households in the synthetic control region
display the same relevant characteristics on average before the policy is implemented. The
matching procedure is supposed to produce exactly such a counterfactual satisfying this
assumption and considering the pre-2009 trend enables me to verify how reasonable the
assumption is. Therefore, reporting the classic standard errors as a measure of uncertainty
around whether the synthetic control is a viable counterfactual is meaningful.
Nevertheless, as an additional check, I provide the classic solution to the problem of
working with aggregate data in the context of the synthetic control method: A placebo
study. Much more directly, implementing the same method for control regions that are
actually unaffected and verifying what change after 2009 can be observed, this gives us
an idea of how precisely the obtained estimates are and whether they are larger than
what “placebo coincidence” would produce. In addition – particularly considering states
that are part of the synthetic control region for placebo checks – this allows us to verify
whether there is systematic movement (in a particular direction) in the synthetic control
region which would suggest endogeneity and render the region invalid as a counterfactual.
As a placebo study, I have carried out the matching procedure to produce a synthetic
control region for each of the 28 non-Niger Delta studies.41 For many states, this procedure
40This is precisely the approach taken by Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), Gong & Rao (2016) and Matta
et al. (2016).
41As a first approach, I matched on the sum of fatalities and the realisations of the four outcome variables
in 2009. However, the synthetic control regions this procedure generated were quite bad matches for
the great majority of the 28 non-Niger Delta states. Therefore, I explicitly matched on realisations
of the outcome variables before 2009 as well which produced synthetic control regions that were
somewhat more congruent with their respective states.
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unfortunately did not produce a good match. Placebo synthetic control regions for any of
the non-Niger Delta states are of course only useful if they produce a reasonable match.
In line with Abadie et al. (2010), I calculate the mean squared prediction error (MSPE)
for all placebo synthetic control regions on the pre-2009 period to evaluate whether the
match is good enough to provide a good placebo check. I present the results for the five
non-Niger Delta states, the synthetic control region of which had an MSPE not exceeding
thirty times the MSPE of my original synthetic control region in relation to the Niger
Delta region.42 The gap between the state to be matched and its synthetic control in the
four outcome variables of interest are presented for the Niger Delta region (black) as well
as the five admissible non-Niger Delta states (Anambra, Gombe, Kogi, Niger, Ogun) as
placebos (grey) in Figures 11 to 14.
Figure 11: Education Placebo Results
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The results for education and self-employment income show clearly that the estimates
for the Niger Delta region are outside the interval of mere randomness. In both cases, the
estimated difference between the Niger Delta region and its synthetic counterfactual in
42I separately considered the MSPE for realisations of the four outcome variables and conflict and imposed
the condition on all of them. For the outcome variables, I considered the MSPE for the pre-2009 trend
while I considered in particular the post-2009 period from 2010 to early 2013 for the conflict realisation.
The idea is that a valid placebo synthetic control region obviously would not experience any change
in conflict during this period; therefore, the synthetic control region is supposed to provide a good
match on conflict for this period. Note also that the factor of 30 relative to the original synthetic
control’s MSPE as a tolerance allows for substantial variation of the synthetic control regions around
the actual realisations of their respective non-Niger Delta state to be reproduced. However, given
that the majority of matches actually produces little congruent synthetic controls, this factor seemed
to be the most reasonable number in the trade-off between having decent matches and having enough
placebo studies to include.
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Figure 12: Health Placebo Results
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Figure 13: Empl. Inc. Placebo Results
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Figure 14: Expend. Placebo Results
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2013 takes the largest value in comparison to the placebo studies. For health, the results
are quite unclear which is in line with the fact that the main result gives an insignificant
effect.43 With regards to household expenditure, the Niger Delta estimate is not clearly
outside the range of the placebo results. In spite of significance of the main results, this
means that the results on household expenditure should be interpreted with a considerable
degree of uncertainty. However, it is important to bear in mind that the placebo studies
considered here include synthetic control regions that have non-negligible MSPEs on the
pre-trend already, i.e. they are suboptimal matches. Therefore, it may not be surprising to
see considerable gaps between the non-Niger Delta states and their respective synthetic
control regions in 2013 as well. In addition, in spite of these substantial gaps, it is
reassuring that this may to a large degree be actual randomness since there does not
seem to be a systematic uni-directional “effect” that all placebo studies show jointly.
In particular, it is interesting to consider the placebo results for the two non-Niger Delta
states that are part of the Niger Delta’s synthetic control region (Anambra, Ogun; dashed
grey lines). Although the gap between them and their respective placebo synthetic control
region is large, it goes in opposite directions for the two and has approximately the same
magnitude (-36.35 USD and 35.41 USD, respectively). In fact, for both the education
and self-employment income placebo studies, the results on Anambra and Ogun also go
43The measure for health employed here has great standard errors and does not have by far as large
a sample size as the other measures. Therefore, it may not be very surprising that the Niger Delta
estimate and placebo results display great variation and generally imperfect matches.
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in opposite directions. This provides some confidence that deviations are not systematic
and the Niger Delta’s synthetic counterfactual is not subject to endogeneity.
9. Conclusion
Building on the existing micro-empirical literature on the consequences of conflict, this
paper provides evidence from Nigeria. Regarding the issue from the converse perspec-
tive, I estimate the benefits of peace for education, health, self-employment income and
household expenditures. For this estimation, I make use of the ‘Presidential Amnesty Pro-
gram’ carried out by the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta region which granted
ex-militants in the region pardon, cash and required them to join a ‘Disarmament, Demo-
bilisation and Reintegration’ programme in return for surrendering their weapons. This
policy shock led to a period of peace in the region and provides a unique setting to esti-
mate a peace dividend by comparing the Niger Delta region to a synthetic within-country
counterfactual in the spirit of Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003). The synthetic control region
does not fail to reproduce the pre-2009 trend in the Niger Delta region and the estimation
results are robust to several checks.
I find that peace in the Niger Delta region resulted in an average of 0.53 more years of
schooling, a 67% increase in self-employment income at the median and a 19% increase in
household expenditures at the median four years later. The estimated impact on health is
insignificantly positive, but very imprecisely measured. These results are to be interpreted
as the peace dividend generated by the amnesty policy in the Niger Delta region relative to
a counterfactual of sustained conflict in the region. Although suffering from a considerable
degree of uncertainty around the point estimates, they may even provide a lower bound
to the true effects of peace if we were to assume (not unrealistically) that violent conflict
in the Niger Delta region would not have remained constant, but further escalated in the
absence of the amnesty policy.
The estimates give us an idea of how large and varied the effects of peace – or conversely,
conflict – potentially are for different outcomes of economic importance and provoke two
exciting questions for further research. Firstly, what are the consequences of conflict for
different areas of economic activity beyond general economic performance? Given the
extra-ordinarily large effect I find for self-employment income and that there is only one
other paper exploring this channel, it seems worthwhile trying to dissect effects on overall
economic performance in its various components. Secondly, do these large effects persist
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long into the future and or do affected regions or countries converge back to their non-
conflict counterfactual eventually? Although there is some literature exploring effects in
the very long run, the results are inconclusive. More micro-empirical research employing
methods that can plausibly establish causal links, such as the synthetic control method,
and identify mechanisms between various outcomes and welfare seem necessary to find an
answer to this question.
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Appendix
A. Conflict Reversal in the Niger Delta Region
As an additional regression peace of analysis on the first stage, consider the Niger Delta
region only. A simple regression of fatalities from 2006 to 2015 on a dummy taking the
value 1 from 2010 onwards (2010+ dummy) – essentially a mean comparison – shows a
significant reduction in conflict. I consider an effect from 2010 only since the policy came
officially in effect in August 2009 as a response to violent conflict in earlier years and
particularly early 2009 itself. Therefore, conflict in 2009 is actually quite high and only
reduces from 2010 onwards. This effect is particularly strong for more violent events,
defined here as events involving at least five fatalities. In addition to this reduction in
conflict, there is also a stark trend reversal. A further regression including a time regressor
for years as time periods starting in 2006 and an interaction with the 2010+ dummy –
again, for more violent events – shows a significant and substantial trend reversal. The
results are shown in Table 5 and 6.
Table 5: First Stage in the Niger Delta Region
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
2010+ dummy -34.067∗∗∗ (12.934)
Intercept 44.781∗∗∗ (9.744)
N 74
R2 0.088
F (1,72) 6.938
Note: The dependent variable is fatalities in a vi-
olent conflict event involving at least five fatalities.
The 2010+ dummy takes the value 1 for 2010 and
all following years and 0 otherwise. The regressor
time is a normalised year variable taking the value 0
for 2006 and by one unit increasing values for follow-
ing years. Normal standard errors are computed and
reported, but heteroskedasticity-robust standard er-
rors change none of the significances. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote significane at the 1%, 5% and 10% level based
on two-sided testing, respectively.
Table 6: First Stage Trend in the Niger Delta Region
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
2010+ dummy 97.093∗∗ (43.569)
time 36.664∗∗∗ (8.156)
2010+ dummy × time -40.087 (9.295)
Intercept -59.481 (24.763)
N 74
R2 0.297
F (3,70) 9.849
Note: see Table 5.
VIII
